Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market

On-demand ride-sourcing platforms have quickly emerged and become ubiquitous in our daily lives. Motivated by the rising public concern about service quality in the ride-sourcing market, this paper aims to examine the impact of exclusion policy that can serve as both quality management and supply re...

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Main Authors: LI, Xiaonan, LI, Xiangyong, WANG, Hai, SHI, Junxin, ANEJA, Yash P.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7748
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-87512023-01-19T07:54:03Z Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market LI, Xiaonan LI, Xiangyong WANG, Hai SHI, Junxin ANEJA, Yash P. On-demand ride-sourcing platforms have quickly emerged and become ubiquitous in our daily lives. Motivated by the rising public concern about service quality in the ride-sourcing market, this paper aims to examine the impact of exclusion policy that can serve as both quality management and supply regulation strategy. With an exclusion policy, the platform excludes low-quality service providers/drivers from the ride-sourcing market by setting a quality threshold of admission (QTA). We propose a model to describe and analyze the market equilibrium under the exclusion policy and present our analytical and numerical results – some of which are non-intuitive and intriguing. Considering network effects captured by both quality and quantity of service in the market, we find that both the realized supply and total labor welfare are not reduced but rather increase when the platform implements a well-designed exclusion policy. Whereas the platform’s profit, customer surplus, labor welfare, and social welfare are each non-monotonic in the QTA level – first increasing and then decreasing – a moderate level of QTA can benefit all stakeholders (platform, drivers, and passengers) in the market. We also analyze the model with alternative network effects and present the theoretical and numerical results. Using the model, we further identify the principal factors in determining the optimal exclusion policy; these include passengers’ quality preference, labor pool size, and quality differentiation among registered drivers. 2022-12-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7748 info:doi/10.1016/j.trb.2022.10.005 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Ride-sourcing services Supply regulation Ex-ante quality management Exclusion policy Quality threshold of admission Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Databases and Information Systems
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Ride-sourcing services
Supply regulation
Ex-ante quality management
Exclusion policy
Quality threshold of admission
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Databases and Information Systems
spellingShingle Ride-sourcing services
Supply regulation
Ex-ante quality management
Exclusion policy
Quality threshold of admission
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Databases and Information Systems
LI, Xiaonan
LI, Xiangyong
WANG, Hai
SHI, Junxin
ANEJA, Yash P.
Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
description On-demand ride-sourcing platforms have quickly emerged and become ubiquitous in our daily lives. Motivated by the rising public concern about service quality in the ride-sourcing market, this paper aims to examine the impact of exclusion policy that can serve as both quality management and supply regulation strategy. With an exclusion policy, the platform excludes low-quality service providers/drivers from the ride-sourcing market by setting a quality threshold of admission (QTA). We propose a model to describe and analyze the market equilibrium under the exclusion policy and present our analytical and numerical results – some of which are non-intuitive and intriguing. Considering network effects captured by both quality and quantity of service in the market, we find that both the realized supply and total labor welfare are not reduced but rather increase when the platform implements a well-designed exclusion policy. Whereas the platform’s profit, customer surplus, labor welfare, and social welfare are each non-monotonic in the QTA level – first increasing and then decreasing – a moderate level of QTA can benefit all stakeholders (platform, drivers, and passengers) in the market. We also analyze the model with alternative network effects and present the theoretical and numerical results. Using the model, we further identify the principal factors in determining the optimal exclusion policy; these include passengers’ quality preference, labor pool size, and quality differentiation among registered drivers.
format text
author LI, Xiaonan
LI, Xiangyong
WANG, Hai
SHI, Junxin
ANEJA, Yash P.
author_facet LI, Xiaonan
LI, Xiangyong
WANG, Hai
SHI, Junxin
ANEJA, Yash P.
author_sort LI, Xiaonan
title Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
title_short Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
title_full Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
title_fullStr Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
title_full_unstemmed Supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
title_sort supply regulation under the exclusion policy in a ride-sourcing market
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2022
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7748
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