Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS

To motivate users to submit high quality data for mobile crowdsensing (MCS), some quality-aware incentive mechanisms have been proposed, which recruit and pay users strategically. However, in the existing mechanisms, the recruitment based only on tasks matching degree leads to the ineffective insist...

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Main Authors: ZHANG, Man, LI, Xinghua, MIAO, Yinbin, LUO, Bin, MA, Siqi, CHOO, Kim-Kwang Raymond, DENG, Robert H.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2024
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/8661
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Institution: Singapore Management University
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-96642024-02-22T03:00:04Z Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS ZHANG, Man LI, Xinghua MIAO, Yinbin LUO, Bin MA, Siqi CHOO, Kim-Kwang Raymond DENG, Robert H. To motivate users to submit high quality data for mobile crowdsensing (MCS), some quality-aware incentive mechanisms have been proposed, which recruit and pay users strategically. However, in the existing mechanisms, the recruitment based only on tasks matching degree leads to the ineffective insistent data quality incentive. Meanwhile, the absence of the reasonable payment strategy cannot motivate users to submit high quality data in the current task. To address the above problems, we propose an Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism (Oasis) to realize the quality incentive in both recruitment and payment phases. With the knapsack secretary, Oasis first devises a quality-aware pre-budgeting recruitment strategy, which decides whether the arriving user's long-term data quality and bid satisfy the recruited criterion. Then, in the payment phase, Oasis evaluates and updates the current and long-term data qualities of users. Based on the evaluation results, a two-level payment strategy is devised employing the Myerson theorem, where users submitting higher quality data can obtain more utilities under the budget constraint. Theoretical analysis proves that Oasis satisfies economic feasibility and constant competitiveness while achieving quality incentive in recruitment and payment phases. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that the sensing result accuracy of Oasis increases 67% compared with the existing works. 2024-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/8661 info:doi/10.1109/TSC.2024.3354240 Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Task Analysis Sensors Data Integrity Recruitment Costs Resumes Reliability Knapsack Secretary Mobile Crowdsensing Online Recruit Quality Aware Incentive Mechanisms Databases and Information Systems
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Task Analysis
Sensors
Data Integrity
Recruitment
Costs
Resumes
Reliability
Knapsack Secretary
Mobile Crowdsensing
Online Recruit
Quality Aware Incentive Mechanisms
Databases and Information Systems
spellingShingle Task Analysis
Sensors
Data Integrity
Recruitment
Costs
Resumes
Reliability
Knapsack Secretary
Mobile Crowdsensing
Online Recruit
Quality Aware Incentive Mechanisms
Databases and Information Systems
ZHANG, Man
LI, Xinghua
MIAO, Yinbin
LUO, Bin
MA, Siqi
CHOO, Kim-Kwang Raymond
DENG, Robert H.
Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS
description To motivate users to submit high quality data for mobile crowdsensing (MCS), some quality-aware incentive mechanisms have been proposed, which recruit and pay users strategically. However, in the existing mechanisms, the recruitment based only on tasks matching degree leads to the ineffective insistent data quality incentive. Meanwhile, the absence of the reasonable payment strategy cannot motivate users to submit high quality data in the current task. To address the above problems, we propose an Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism (Oasis) to realize the quality incentive in both recruitment and payment phases. With the knapsack secretary, Oasis first devises a quality-aware pre-budgeting recruitment strategy, which decides whether the arriving user's long-term data quality and bid satisfy the recruited criterion. Then, in the payment phase, Oasis evaluates and updates the current and long-term data qualities of users. Based on the evaluation results, a two-level payment strategy is devised employing the Myerson theorem, where users submitting higher quality data can obtain more utilities under the budget constraint. Theoretical analysis proves that Oasis satisfies economic feasibility and constant competitiveness while achieving quality incentive in recruitment and payment phases. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that the sensing result accuracy of Oasis increases 67% compared with the existing works.
format text
author ZHANG, Man
LI, Xinghua
MIAO, Yinbin
LUO, Bin
MA, Siqi
CHOO, Kim-Kwang Raymond
DENG, Robert H.
author_facet ZHANG, Man
LI, Xinghua
MIAO, Yinbin
LUO, Bin
MA, Siqi
CHOO, Kim-Kwang Raymond
DENG, Robert H.
author_sort ZHANG, Man
title Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS
title_short Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS
title_full Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS
title_fullStr Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS
title_full_unstemmed Oasis: Online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for MCS
title_sort oasis: online all-phase quality-aware incentive mechanism for mcs
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2024
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/8661
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