When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports

In an effort to increase the transparency and quality of the public auditing profession, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB was granted inspection rights to 'audit' auditors and their respective audi...

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Main Authors: Abbott, Lawrence J., Gunny, Katherine A., ZHANG, Tracey Chunqi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/96
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1071/
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soa_research-10952023-06-14T02:16:27Z When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports Abbott, Lawrence J. Gunny, Katherine A. ZHANG, Tracey Chunqi In an effort to increase the transparency and quality of the public auditing profession, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB was granted inspection rights to 'audit' auditors and their respective audit processes. The PCAOB is an independent, private sector body that has replaced the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants peer review system. The results of PCAOB inspections are summarized in publicly-available reports that are readily accessible at the PCAOB's website. We posit that due to the objectivity, specificity, variation and visibility of these reports, the PCAOB has created a powerful public signal of perceived audit quality. We hypothesize that registrants with high potential agency conflicts have incentive to switch away from auditors that have received an adverse, GAAP-deficient PCAOB report. In addition, we argue that effective audit committees have similar motivation to switch away from such auditors. Using logistic regressions, we document a strong agency-based demand for perceived audit quality as proxied by the PCAOB inspection reports. We also show that effective audit committees are particularly sensitive to the receipt of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and are much more likely to switch auditors subsequent to the inspection report disclosure. Our evidence on the cross sectional differences of clients' reactions to PCAOB inspection reports contribute to the understanding of auditor industry regulations. 2008-08-01T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/96 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1071/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University PCAOB agency costs audit quality Accounting Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic PCAOB
agency costs
audit quality
Accounting
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle PCAOB
agency costs
audit quality
Accounting
Corporate Finance
Abbott, Lawrence J.
Gunny, Katherine A.
ZHANG, Tracey Chunqi
When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
description In an effort to increase the transparency and quality of the public auditing profession, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB was granted inspection rights to 'audit' auditors and their respective audit processes. The PCAOB is an independent, private sector body that has replaced the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants peer review system. The results of PCAOB inspections are summarized in publicly-available reports that are readily accessible at the PCAOB's website. We posit that due to the objectivity, specificity, variation and visibility of these reports, the PCAOB has created a powerful public signal of perceived audit quality. We hypothesize that registrants with high potential agency conflicts have incentive to switch away from auditors that have received an adverse, GAAP-deficient PCAOB report. In addition, we argue that effective audit committees have similar motivation to switch away from such auditors. Using logistic regressions, we document a strong agency-based demand for perceived audit quality as proxied by the PCAOB inspection reports. We also show that effective audit committees are particularly sensitive to the receipt of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and are much more likely to switch auditors subsequent to the inspection report disclosure. Our evidence on the cross sectional differences of clients' reactions to PCAOB inspection reports contribute to the understanding of auditor industry regulations.
format text
author Abbott, Lawrence J.
Gunny, Katherine A.
ZHANG, Tracey Chunqi
author_facet Abbott, Lawrence J.
Gunny, Katherine A.
ZHANG, Tracey Chunqi
author_sort Abbott, Lawrence J.
title When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
title_short When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
title_full When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
title_fullStr When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
title_full_unstemmed When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Client Firm Reaction to Adverse, GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
title_sort when the pcaob talks, who listens? evidence from client firm reaction to adverse, gaap-deficient pcaob inspection reports
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2008
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/96
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1071/
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