Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts
This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and mor...
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2010
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sg-smu-ink.soa_research-17952017-10-20T05:55:24Z Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts LEE, Jimmy This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earningsforecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions andshow that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with more informative andhigher quality guidance. In particular, I find that these forecasts are more accurate, unbiased, more specific and timely, consistent with equity incentives aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests regarding disclosure decisions. However, I find mixed evidence on the association between board governance and forecast quality. 2010-01-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/796 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/1795/viewcontent/SSRN_id1650289.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Earnings guidance corporate governance executive compensation Accounting Corporate Finance |
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This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earningsforecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions andshow that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with more informative andhigher quality guidance. In particular, I find that these forecasts are more accurate, unbiased, more specific and timely, consistent with equity incentives aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests regarding disclosure decisions. However, I find mixed evidence on the association between board governance and forecast quality. |
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LEE, Jimmy |
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LEE, Jimmy |
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LEE, Jimmy |
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Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts |
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Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts |
title_full |
Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts |
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Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts |
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Moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts |
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moral hazard, firms’ internal governance and management earnings forecasts |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2010 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/796 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/1795/viewcontent/SSRN_id1650289.pdf |
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