Insider trading and voluntary disclosures
We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when manag...
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Main Authors: | CHENG, Qiang, LO, Kin |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2006
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/827 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/1826/viewcontent/SSRN_id510842.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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