Managerial incentives and management forecast precision
Despite managers’ great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision, or the specificity, of their earnings forecasts for self-...
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Main Authors: | CHENG, Qiang, Luo, Ting, Yue, Heng |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/981 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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