Managers' pay duration and voluntary disclosures

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: CHENG, Qiang, CHO, Young Jun, KIM, Jae Bum
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
• الموضوعات: Voluntary disclosures; management forecasts; executive compensation; pay duration; Accounting; Corporate Finance
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1207; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2206/viewcontent/Managers__pay_duration_and_voluntary_disclosures.pdf

In this paper, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings fore...