Do politically connected directors affect accounting quality? Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign (Rule 18)

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: HOPE, Ole-Kristian, YUE, Heng, ZHONG, Qinlin
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2017
• الموضوعات: Political Connections; Accounting Quality; China; Anti-Corruption Campaign; Causal Effects; Exogenous Shock; Accounting; Asian Studies; Corporate Finance
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1568; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2595/viewcontent/SSRN_id2899403.pdf

We examine the impact of politically connected directors on accounting quality using a quasi experiment in China. In October 2013, “Rule 18” was issued to prohibit government and party officials, who were concurrently holding public offices or had recently retired from such positions within the last...