Do politically connected directors affect accounting quality? Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign (Rule 18)
We examine the impact of politically connected directors on accounting quality using a quasi experiment in China. In October 2013, “Rule 18” was issued to prohibit government and party officials, who were concurrently holding public offices or had recently retired from such positions within the last...
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Main Authors: | HOPE, Ole-Kristian, YUE, Heng, ZHONG, Qinlin |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2017
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1568 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2595/viewcontent/SSRN_id2899403.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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