Consequences to directors of shareholder activism
Using a comprehensive sample for 2004–2012, we examine the impact of shareholder activist campaigns on the careers of directors of targeted firms. We find that activism is associated with directors being almost twice as likely to leave—and performance-sensitivity of turnover being higher over the su...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1590 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2617/viewcontent/14_071_c6c751e0_cf63_4c54_babb_e06fdefef4ac.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Using a comprehensive sample for 2004–2012, we examine the impact of shareholder activist campaigns on the careers of directors of targeted firms. We find that activism is associated with directors being almost twice as likely to leave—and performance-sensitivity of turnover being higher over the subsequent two-year period. Our evidence suggests that director turnover occurs even without shareholder activists engaging in, let alone winning, proxy contests and, in contrast to most prior research, director election results matter. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholder activism, even in the absence of proxy fights, is associated with greater accountability for independent directors. |
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