Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading

Recent studies argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance can be used to facilitate managerial rent extraction from shareholders (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007). Despite this agency view of tax avoidance receiving increasing attention in the literature, there is li...

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Main Authors: Chung, Sung Gon, GOH, Beng Wee, LEE, Kiat Bee Jimmy, SHEVLIN, Terry J.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1635
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2662/viewcontent/CorporateTaxAggressivenessInsider_2015_wp.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soa_research-26622017-10-23T02:14:52Z Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading Chung, Sung Gon GOH, Beng Wee LEE, Kiat Bee Jimmy SHEVLIN, Terry J. Recent studies argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance can be used to facilitate managerial rent extraction from shareholders (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007). Despite this agency view of tax avoidance receiving increasing attention in the literature, there is limited empirical evidence that managers actually extract rents generated from tax avoidance activities. In this paper, we examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction in the form of insider trading profitability. We document that, on average, insider purchase profitability, but not sale profitability, is significantly higher in more tax aggressive firms. The positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and for firms with better information environments. Finally, we find that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sale volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Our study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that managers do, in fact, extract insider trading rents through corporate tax aggressiveness (Armstrong et al. 2015) and the findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences. 2015-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1635 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2662/viewcontent/CorporateTaxAggressivenessInsider_2015_wp.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Tax aggressiveness insider trading litigation risk managerial rent extraction Accounting Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Tax aggressiveness
insider trading
litigation risk
managerial rent extraction
Accounting
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Tax aggressiveness
insider trading
litigation risk
managerial rent extraction
Accounting
Corporate Finance
Chung, Sung Gon
GOH, Beng Wee
LEE, Kiat Bee Jimmy
SHEVLIN, Terry J.
Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading
description Recent studies argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance can be used to facilitate managerial rent extraction from shareholders (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007). Despite this agency view of tax avoidance receiving increasing attention in the literature, there is limited empirical evidence that managers actually extract rents generated from tax avoidance activities. In this paper, we examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction in the form of insider trading profitability. We document that, on average, insider purchase profitability, but not sale profitability, is significantly higher in more tax aggressive firms. The positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and for firms with better information environments. Finally, we find that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sale volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Our study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that managers do, in fact, extract insider trading rents through corporate tax aggressiveness (Armstrong et al. 2015) and the findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences.
format text
author Chung, Sung Gon
GOH, Beng Wee
LEE, Kiat Bee Jimmy
SHEVLIN, Terry J.
author_facet Chung, Sung Gon
GOH, Beng Wee
LEE, Kiat Bee Jimmy
SHEVLIN, Terry J.
author_sort Chung, Sung Gon
title Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading
title_short Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading
title_full Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading
title_fullStr Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading
title_full_unstemmed Corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from insider trading
title_sort corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction: evidence from insider trading
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2015
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1635
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2662/viewcontent/CorporateTaxAggressivenessInsider_2015_wp.pdf
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