Debt heterogeneity and covenants
Coordination failure among owners of heterogeneous debt types increases distress costs. Covenants reduce expected distress costs by lowering the probability of liquidity shortages, increasing liquidation values, and incentivizing creditor monitoring. We predict and find that new debt contracts inclu...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
|
| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1754 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2781/viewcontent/SSRN_id2297804.pdf |
| 標簽: |
添加標簽
沒有標簽, 成為第一個標記此記錄!
|