Auditor choice and information asymmetry: Evidence from international syndicated loans

• Main Authors: MA, Zhiming, STICE, Derrald, WANG, Rencheng
• 格式: text
• 語言: English
• 出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
• 主題: big N auditors; international debt markets; loan syndicate structure; creditor rights; trust; Accounting; Corporate Finance
• 在線閱讀: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1814; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2841/viewcontent/Auditor_Choice_IA_sv.pdf

Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower...