Auditor choice and information asymmetry: Evidence from international syndicated loans

Auditor choice and information asymmetry: Evidence from international syndicated loans

Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: MA, Zhiming, STICE, Derrald, WANG, Rencheng
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
Subjects:
big N auditors
international debt markets
loan syndicate structure
creditor rights
trust
Accounting
Corporate Finance
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1814
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2841/viewcontent/Auditor_Choice_IA_sv.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1814
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2841/viewcontent/Auditor_Choice_IA_sv.pdf

Similar Items