Local political corruption and M&As

We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of...

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Main Authors: LIU, Chun, CHEN, Yang, LI, Shanmin, SUN, Liang, YANG, Mengjie
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2021
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1960
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2987/viewcontent/LocalCorruption_av.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soa_research-29872022-04-22T04:04:23Z Local political corruption and M&As LIU, Chun CHEN, Yang LI, Shanmin SUN, Liang YANG, Mengjie We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of local corruption on the probability of cross-province M&As are stronger when corrupt officers have greater impeding benefits or lower impeding costs. Meanwhile, Both ex-ante intervention and ex post punishment are important channels through which corrupt officers hinder firms' cross province M&As. Moreover, informal institutions, such as social capital and informal networks can help to alleviate the negative impact of political corruption on firms' cross-province M&As. Our findings show that in the context of highly government intervention, cross-province M&As not only cannot be an effective channel to shield from expropriation, but are themselves highly distorted and lead to significant economic efficiency losses. 2021-10-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1960 info:doi/10.1016/j.chieco.2021.101677 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2987/viewcontent/LocalCorruption_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Political corruption Anti-corruption campaign M&As China Accounting Asian Studies Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Political corruption
Anti-corruption campaign
M&As
China
Accounting
Asian Studies
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Political corruption
Anti-corruption campaign
M&As
China
Accounting
Asian Studies
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
LIU, Chun
CHEN, Yang
LI, Shanmin
SUN, Liang
YANG, Mengjie
Local political corruption and M&As
description We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of local corruption on the probability of cross-province M&As are stronger when corrupt officers have greater impeding benefits or lower impeding costs. Meanwhile, Both ex-ante intervention and ex post punishment are important channels through which corrupt officers hinder firms' cross province M&As. Moreover, informal institutions, such as social capital and informal networks can help to alleviate the negative impact of political corruption on firms' cross-province M&As. Our findings show that in the context of highly government intervention, cross-province M&As not only cannot be an effective channel to shield from expropriation, but are themselves highly distorted and lead to significant economic efficiency losses.
format text
author LIU, Chun
CHEN, Yang
LI, Shanmin
SUN, Liang
YANG, Mengjie
author_facet LIU, Chun
CHEN, Yang
LI, Shanmin
SUN, Liang
YANG, Mengjie
author_sort LIU, Chun
title Local political corruption and M&As
title_short Local political corruption and M&As
title_full Local political corruption and M&As
title_fullStr Local political corruption and M&As
title_full_unstemmed Local political corruption and M&As
title_sort local political corruption and m&as
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2021
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1960
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2987/viewcontent/LocalCorruption_av.pdf
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