Local political corruption and M&As
We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of...
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sg-smu-ink.soa_research-29872022-04-22T04:04:23Z Local political corruption and M&As LIU, Chun CHEN, Yang LI, Shanmin SUN, Liang YANG, Mengjie We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of local corruption on the probability of cross-province M&As are stronger when corrupt officers have greater impeding benefits or lower impeding costs. Meanwhile, Both ex-ante intervention and ex post punishment are important channels through which corrupt officers hinder firms' cross province M&As. Moreover, informal institutions, such as social capital and informal networks can help to alleviate the negative impact of political corruption on firms' cross-province M&As. Our findings show that in the context of highly government intervention, cross-province M&As not only cannot be an effective channel to shield from expropriation, but are themselves highly distorted and lead to significant economic efficiency losses. 2021-10-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1960 info:doi/10.1016/j.chieco.2021.101677 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2987/viewcontent/LocalCorruption_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Political corruption Anti-corruption campaign M&As China Accounting Asian Studies Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Corporate Finance |
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Political corruption Anti-corruption campaign M&As China Accounting Asian Studies Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Corporate Finance LIU, Chun CHEN, Yang LI, Shanmin SUN, Liang YANG, Mengjie Local political corruption and M&As |
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We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of local corruption on the probability of cross-province M&As are stronger when corrupt officers have greater impeding benefits or lower impeding costs. Meanwhile, Both ex-ante intervention and ex post punishment are important channels through which corrupt officers hinder firms' cross province M&As. Moreover, informal institutions, such as social capital and informal networks can help to alleviate the negative impact of political corruption on firms' cross-province M&As. Our findings show that in the context of highly government intervention, cross-province M&As not only cannot be an effective channel to shield from expropriation, but are themselves highly distorted and lead to significant economic efficiency losses. |
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LIU, Chun CHEN, Yang LI, Shanmin SUN, Liang YANG, Mengjie |
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LIU, Chun CHEN, Yang LI, Shanmin SUN, Liang YANG, Mengjie |
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LIU, Chun |
title |
Local political corruption and M&As |
title_short |
Local political corruption and M&As |
title_full |
Local political corruption and M&As |
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Local political corruption and M&As |
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Local political corruption and M&As |
title_sort |
local political corruption and m&as |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2021 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1960 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2987/viewcontent/LocalCorruption_av.pdf |
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