Can honesty reminders reduce dishonesty in budgetary slack?

Can honesty reminders reduce dishonesty in budgetary slack?

This study investigates the effect of honesty reminders on budgetary slack. Based on self-concept maintenance theory, the authors posit that honesty reminders can reduce budgetary slack by making people more aware of their own standards of honesty, resulting in more honest behavior. Using an experim...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHENG, Wilfred W. H., LIM, Chee Yeow, YUEN, Chi Kwan
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2023
Subjects:
Budgetary slack
honesty reminders
dishonesty thresholds
trust
self-concept maintenance theory
experimental research
participative budgeting
Accounting
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/2003
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/3030/viewcontent/Honesty_Reminders_Reduce_Dishonesty_in_Budgetary_Slack_av.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
Description
Summary:This study investigates the effect of honesty reminders on budgetary slack. Based on self-concept maintenance theory, the authors posit that honesty reminders can reduce budgetary slack by making people more aware of their own standards of honesty, resulting in more honest behavior. Using an experimental research design, the authors find evidence that honesty reminders reduce budgetary slack. The authors also find that although penalties can similarly reduce budgetary slack, they tend to cause distrust and resentment from subordinates. Therefore, honesty reminders may be a less costly method than penalties for reducing budgetary slack.

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