The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism

This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the de...

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Main Author: Chang, Pao Li
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2004
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/832
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1831/viewcontent/ThePoliticsofWTOEnforcement.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-18312016-12-29T10:13:12Z The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism Chang, Pao Li This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, given the political and economic environments on both sides of the disputing parties. This paper also captures the possibility of enforcement failures under the current WTO dispute settlement procedure, where the complainant does not have enough retaliation capacity to induce compliance or some form of compensation from the defendant. 2004-07-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/832 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1831/viewcontent/ThePoliticsofWTOEnforcement.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University trade sanction; enforcement failure; compliance; compensation; political economy International Economics International Trade Law Political Economy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic trade sanction; enforcement failure; compliance; compensation; political economy
International Economics
International Trade Law
Political Economy
spellingShingle trade sanction; enforcement failure; compliance; compensation; political economy
International Economics
International Trade Law
Political Economy
Chang, Pao Li
The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism
description This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, given the political and economic environments on both sides of the disputing parties. This paper also captures the possibility of enforcement failures under the current WTO dispute settlement procedure, where the complainant does not have enough retaliation capacity to induce compliance or some form of compensation from the defendant.
format text
author Chang, Pao Li
author_facet Chang, Pao Li
author_sort Chang, Pao Li
title The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism
title_short The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism
title_full The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism
title_fullStr The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism
title_full_unstemmed The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanism
title_sort politics of wto enforcement mechanism
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2004
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/832
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1831/viewcontent/ThePoliticsofWTOEnforcement.pdf
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