Set Inference for Semiparametric Discrete Games
We consider estimation and inference of parameters in discrete games allowing for multiple equilibria, without using an equilibrium selection rule. We do a set inference while a game model can contain infinite dimensional parameters. Examples can include signaling games with discrete types where the...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2006
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/900 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1899/viewcontent/ProfiledSetInference_res.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We consider estimation and inference of parameters in discrete games allowing for multiple equilibria, without using an equilibrium selection rule. We do a set inference while a game model can contain infinite dimensional parameters. Examples can include signaling games with discrete types where the type distribution is nonparametrically specified and entry-exit games with partially linear payoffs functions. A consistent set estimator and a confidence interval of a function of parameters are provided in this paper. We note that achieving a consistent point estimation often requires an information reduction. Due to this less use of information, we may end up a point estimator with a larger variance and have a wider confidence interval than those of the set estimator using the full information in the model. This finding justifies the use of the set inference even though we can achieve a consistent point estimation. It is an interesting future research to compare these two alternatives: CI from the point estimation with the usage of less information vs. CI from the set estimation with the usage of the full information. |
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