Inefficient Worker Turnover
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers' mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is le...
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2006
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/927 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1926&context=soe_research |
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-19262010-09-23T05:48:03Z Inefficient Worker Turnover JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers' mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that the efficiency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be efficient. This is because without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly offer workers contracts that will guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches. 2006-09-07T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/927 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1926&context=soe_research http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University On-the-Job Search; Learning; Bargaining; Contracts; Enforceability Labor Economics |
| institution |
Singapore Management University |
| building |
SMU Libraries |
| continent |
Asia |
| country |
Singapore Singapore |
| content_provider |
SMU Libraries |
| collection |
InK@SMU |
| language |
English |
| topic |
On-the-Job Search; Learning; Bargaining; Contracts; Enforceability Labor Economics |
| spellingShingle |
On-the-Job Search; Learning; Bargaining; Contracts; Enforceability Labor Economics JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| description |
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers' mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt after the match is formed. It is shown that the efficiency of worker turnover depends on contract enforceability, and that in the absence of complete enforceability the equilibrium fails to be efficient. This is because without complete enforceability firms cannot credibly offer workers contracts that will guarantee them the entire future of all potential future matches. |
| format |
text |
| author |
JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
| author_facet |
JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
| author_sort |
JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
| title |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_short |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_full |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_fullStr |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Inefficient Worker Turnover |
| title_sort |
inefficient worker turnover |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2006 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/927 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1926&context=soe_research |
| _version_ |
1712301094100533248 |