Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover

This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, and where matches are experience goods. It is shown that the efficiency of workers mobility decisions depends on the degree of enforce...

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主要作者: JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent
格式: text
語言:English
出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
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在線閱讀:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1690
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機構: Singapore Management University
語言: English