Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, and where matches are experience goods. It is shown that the efficiency of workers mobility decisions depends on the degree of enforce...
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2016
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-26892019-08-26T02:27:32Z Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, and where matches are experience goods. It is shown that the efficiency of workers mobility decisions depends on the degree of enforceability of contracts: mobility decisions are efficient when contracts are enforceable, while there is too little mobility when contracts are self-enforcing. I also show that in the latter case a simple ring tax can reestablish efficiency, thereby increasing mobility. 2016-08-01T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1690 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University on-the-job search bargaining contracts Behavioral Economics Labor Economics |
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SMU Libraries |
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on-the-job search bargaining contracts Behavioral Economics Labor Economics |
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on-the-job search bargaining contracts Behavioral Economics Labor Economics JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover |
| description |
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, and where matches are experience goods. It is shown that the efficiency of workers mobility decisions depends on the degree of enforceability of contracts: mobility decisions are efficient when contracts are enforceable, while there is too little mobility when contracts are self-enforcing. I also show that in the latter case a simple ring tax can reestablish efficiency, thereby increasing mobility. |
| format |
text |
| author |
JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
| author_facet |
JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
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JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
| title |
Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover |
| title_short |
Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover |
| title_full |
Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover |
| title_fullStr |
Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover |
| title_sort |
contract enforceability and the (in)efficiency of worker turnover |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1690 |
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