Contract Enforceability and the (In)efficiency of Worker Turnover
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, and where matches are experience goods. It is shown that the efficiency of workers mobility decisions depends on the degree of enforce...
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Main Author: | JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1690 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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