Games Suppliers and Producers Play: Upstream and Downstream Moral Hazard with Unverifiable Input Quality
We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer given a framework of bilateral moral hazard with variable but non-verifiable input quality. Given the inability of third parties to verify input quality, each party has an incentive to cheat the other by...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/860 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1859/viewcontent/games.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |