Games Suppliers and Producers Play: Upstream and Downstream Moral Hazard with Unverifiable Input Quality

We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer given a framework of bilateral moral hazard with variable but non-verifiable input quality. Given the inability of third parties to verify input quality, each party has an incentive to cheat the other by...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: GUHA, Brishti
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2005
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/860
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1859/viewcontent/games.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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