The Case of the Errant Executive: Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating

The Case of the Errant Executive: Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating

Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic market outcomes. The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the board, whose objectives differ from those of outside sha...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: GUHA, Brishti
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2005
Subjects:
Moral hazard
firm size
managerial compensation
repeated games
Behavioral Economics
Economics
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/859
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1858/viewcontent/errantexecutive.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/859
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1858/viewcontent/errantexecutive.pdf

Similar Items