The Case of the Errant Executive: Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating
Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic market outcomes. The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the board, whose objectives differ from those of outside sha...
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Main Author: | GUHA, Brishti |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/859 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1858/viewcontent/errantexecutive.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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