Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty

We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action, and show that it is optimal for th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LI, Jiangtao, WANG, Kexin
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/23
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research_all/article/1022/viewcontent/RobustContracting.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English