Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action, and show that it is optimal for th...
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Main Authors: | LI, Jiangtao, WANG, Kexin |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2023
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/23 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research_all/article/1022/viewcontent/RobustContracting.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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