Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty

We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action, and show that it is optimal for th...

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Main Authors: LI, Jiangtao, WANG, Kexin
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2023
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/23
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research_all/article/1022/viewcontent/RobustContracting.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research_all-10222023-08-08T01:37:06Z Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty LI, Jiangtao WANG, Kexin We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action, and show that it is optimal for the principal to adopt a monotone affine contract. We further show that the optimality of monotone affine contracts persists even if the principal has access to other information about the output distributions, such as the information that the output distribution induced by each action has full support. 2023-08-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/23 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research_all/article/1022/viewcontent/RobustContracting.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Robust mechanism design robust contracting distributional uncertainty monotone affine contracts duality approach Economics Economic Theory
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Robust mechanism design
robust contracting
distributional uncertainty
monotone affine contracts
duality approach
Economics
Economic Theory
spellingShingle Robust mechanism design
robust contracting
distributional uncertainty
monotone affine contracts
duality approach
Economics
Economic Theory
LI, Jiangtao
WANG, Kexin
Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
description We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action, and show that it is optimal for the principal to adopt a monotone affine contract. We further show that the optimality of monotone affine contracts persists even if the principal has access to other information about the output distributions, such as the information that the output distribution induced by each action has full support.
format text
author LI, Jiangtao
WANG, Kexin
author_facet LI, Jiangtao
WANG, Kexin
author_sort LI, Jiangtao
title Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
title_short Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
title_full Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
title_fullStr Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
title_sort robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2023
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/23
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research_all/article/1022/viewcontent/RobustContracting.pdf
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