Micro-finance Competition: Motivated Micro-lenders, Double-dipping and Default
We develop a tractable model of competition among motivated MFIs. We find that equilibria may or may not involve double-dipping (and consequently default), with there being double-dipping whenever the MFIs are very profit-oriented. Moreover, in an equilibrium with double-dipping, borrowers who doubl...
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Main Authors: | GUHA, Brishti, ROY CHOWDHURY, Prabal |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1326 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2325/viewcontent/mficompdoubledippingfinalversion.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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