The Structure of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions over Product Domains and Lexicographically Separable Preferences

The Structure of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions over Product Domains and Lexicographically Separable Preferences

We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, ROY, Souvik, SEN, Arunava
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
Subjects:
Strategy-proofness
Lexicographically separable preferences
Generalized random dictatorship
Economics
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1405
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2404/viewcontent/StructureStrategyProofRandomChoiceFn_2012june.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1405
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2404/viewcontent/StructureStrategyProofRandomChoiceFn_2012june.pdf

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