The Structure of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions over Product Domains and Lexicographically Separable Preferences

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, ROY, Souvik, SEN, Arunava
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
• الموضوعات: Strategy-proofness; Lexicographically separable preferences; Generalized random dictatorship; Economics; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1405; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2404/viewcontent/StructureStrategyProofRandomChoiceFn_2012june.pdf

We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice...