The Persistence of Goodness
Experimental evidence and economic examples like Basu's (1984) taxi-driver problem illustrate that many people are honest (or good) even when beyond the reach of the law, and without repeated interactions or reputation effects. We provide game-theoretic underpinnings of the level of goodness in...
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-24252017-08-04T06:44:51Z The Persistence of Goodness GUHA, Ashok S. GUHA, Brishti Experimental evidence and economic examples like Basu's (1984) taxi-driver problem illustrate that many people are honest (or good) even when beyond the reach of the law, and without repeated interactions or reputation effects. We provide game-theoretic underpinnings of the level of goodness in a population. For appropriate parameter ranges, a certain level of good behaviour will emerge as an evolutionarily stable equilibrium: virtue will not be driven out of the population, even in a Darwinian world of the survival of the fittest. The long-run equilibrium proportion of good behaviour is independent of the level of intrinsic goodness. 2012-09-01T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1426 info:doi/10.1628/093245612802920971 https://doi.org/10.1628/093245612802920971 Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Behavioral Economics Economics |
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Behavioral Economics Economics GUHA, Ashok S. GUHA, Brishti The Persistence of Goodness |
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Experimental evidence and economic examples like Basu's (1984) taxi-driver problem illustrate that many people are honest (or good) even when beyond the reach of the law, and without repeated interactions or reputation effects. We provide game-theoretic underpinnings of the level of goodness in a population. For appropriate parameter ranges, a certain level of good behaviour will emerge as an evolutionarily stable equilibrium: virtue will not be driven out of the population, even in a Darwinian world of the survival of the fittest. The long-run equilibrium proportion of good behaviour is independent of the level of intrinsic goodness. |
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text |
author |
GUHA, Ashok S. GUHA, Brishti |
author_facet |
GUHA, Ashok S. GUHA, Brishti |
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GUHA, Ashok S. |
title |
The Persistence of Goodness |
title_short |
The Persistence of Goodness |
title_full |
The Persistence of Goodness |
title_fullStr |
The Persistence of Goodness |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Persistence of Goodness |
title_sort |
persistence of goodness |
publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1426 https://doi.org/10.1628/093245612802920971 |
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1770571462991675392 |