Microfinance Competition: Motivated Microlenders, Double Dipping and Default
We develop a tractable model of competition among socially motivated MFIs, so that the objective functions of the MFIs put some weight on their own clients' utility. We find that the equilibrium involves double-dipping, i.e. borrowers taking multiple loans from different MFIs, whenever the MFIs...
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Main Authors: | GUHA, Brishti, Roy Chowdhury, Prabal |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1528 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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