Signaling in Online Credit Markets

Signaling in Online Credit Markets

We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in markets with adverse selection. Using data from an online credit market, we estimate a model of borrowers and lenders where low reserve interest rates can signal low default risk. Comparing a market with and without signaling relativ...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KAWAI, Kei, ONISHI, Ken, UETAKE, Kosuke
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
Subjects:
Signaling
Adverse Selection
Credit Markets
Structural Model
Economics
Finance
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1733
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2732/viewcontent/Signaling_in_Online_Credit_Markets_wp.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1733
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2732/viewcontent/Signaling_in_Online_Credit_Markets_wp.pdf

Similar Items