Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction

In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy fra...

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Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, Ghosal, Sayantan
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1792
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2791/viewcontent/Technology__unilateral_commitments_Shurojit_2008.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-27912018-07-13T05:41:30Z Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction CHATTERJI, Shurojit Ghosal, Sayantan In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time. 2009-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1792 info:doi/10.1093/cesifo/ifp009 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2791/viewcontent/Technology__unilateral_commitments_Shurojit_2008.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Climate Cumulative Emissions Global Negotiations Reduction Technology Unilateralism Economic Theory Public Economics
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Climate
Cumulative
Emissions
Global
Negotiations
Reduction
Technology
Unilateralism
Economic Theory
Public Economics
spellingShingle Climate
Cumulative
Emissions
Global
Negotiations
Reduction
Technology
Unilateralism
Economic Theory
Public Economics
CHATTERJI, Shurojit
Ghosal, Sayantan
Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
description In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time.
format text
author CHATTERJI, Shurojit
Ghosal, Sayantan
author_facet CHATTERJI, Shurojit
Ghosal, Sayantan
author_sort CHATTERJI, Shurojit
title Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
title_short Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
title_full Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
title_fullStr Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
title_full_unstemmed Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction
title_sort technology, unilateral commitments and cumulative emissions reduction
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2009
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1792
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2791/viewcontent/Technology__unilateral_commitments_Shurojit_2008.pdf
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