A characterization of single‐peaked preferences via random social choice functions
This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfy...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1844 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2843/viewcontent/Shurojit_s_Journal_Article.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barber\303\240 2010). |
|---|