The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1856 |
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| المؤسسة: | Singapore Management University |
| اللغة: | English |
| الملخص: | In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable structures, which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition structures. As an allocation rule on complete coalition structures, this paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value for complete coalition structures and provides an axiomatization. |
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