Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India

We investigate whether judicial decisions are affected by career concerns of judges byanalysing two questions: Do judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favourof the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Court? Does thegovernment actually reward judges who rul...

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Main Authors: ANEY, Madhav S., DAM, Shubhankar, KO, Giovanni
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2017
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1928
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2927/viewcontent/jobs_for_justice.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-29272019-04-19T15:59:43Z Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India ANEY, Madhav S. DAM, Shubhankar KO, Giovanni We investigate whether judicial decisions are affected by career concerns of judges byanalysing two questions: Do judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favourof the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Court? Does thegovernment actually reward judges who ruled in its favour with prestigious jobs? To answerthese questions we construct a dataset of all Supreme Court of India cases involving thegovernment from 1999 till 2014, with an indicator for whether the decision was in its favouror not. We find that pandering incentives have a causal effect on judicial decision-making.The exposure of a judge to pandering incentives in a case is jointly determined by 1) whetherthe case is politically salient (exogenously determined by a system of random allocation ofcases) and 2) whether the judge retires with enough time left in a government’s term tobe rewarded with a prestigious job (date of retirement is exogenously determined by law tobe their 65th birthday). We find that pandering occurs through the more activechannel of writing favourable judgements rather than passively being on a bench that decidesa case in favour of the government. Furthermore, we find that deciding in favour of thegovernment is positively associated with both the likelihood and the speed with which judgesare appointed to prestigious post-Supreme Court jobs. These findings suggest the presenceof corruption in the form government influence over judicial decision-making that seriouslyundermines judicial independence. 2017-02-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1928 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2927/viewcontent/jobs_for_justice.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Judicial decision-making Corruption Career concerns Public sector incentives Asian Studies Ethics and Political Philosophy Judges Political Economy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Judicial decision-making
Corruption
Career concerns
Public sector incentives
Asian Studies
Ethics and Political Philosophy
Judges
Political Economy
spellingShingle Judicial decision-making
Corruption
Career concerns
Public sector incentives
Asian Studies
Ethics and Political Philosophy
Judges
Political Economy
ANEY, Madhav S.
DAM, Shubhankar
KO, Giovanni
Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India
description We investigate whether judicial decisions are affected by career concerns of judges byanalysing two questions: Do judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favourof the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Court? Does thegovernment actually reward judges who ruled in its favour with prestigious jobs? To answerthese questions we construct a dataset of all Supreme Court of India cases involving thegovernment from 1999 till 2014, with an indicator for whether the decision was in its favouror not. We find that pandering incentives have a causal effect on judicial decision-making.The exposure of a judge to pandering incentives in a case is jointly determined by 1) whetherthe case is politically salient (exogenously determined by a system of random allocation ofcases) and 2) whether the judge retires with enough time left in a government’s term tobe rewarded with a prestigious job (date of retirement is exogenously determined by law tobe their 65th birthday). We find that pandering occurs through the more activechannel of writing favourable judgements rather than passively being on a bench that decidesa case in favour of the government. Furthermore, we find that deciding in favour of thegovernment is positively associated with both the likelihood and the speed with which judgesare appointed to prestigious post-Supreme Court jobs. These findings suggest the presenceof corruption in the form government influence over judicial decision-making that seriouslyundermines judicial independence.
format text
author ANEY, Madhav S.
DAM, Shubhankar
KO, Giovanni
author_facet ANEY, Madhav S.
DAM, Shubhankar
KO, Giovanni
author_sort ANEY, Madhav S.
title Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India
title_short Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India
title_full Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India
title_fullStr Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India
title_full_unstemmed Jobs for justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India
title_sort jobs for justice(s): corruption in the supreme court of india
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2017
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1928
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2927/viewcontent/jobs_for_justice.pdf
_version_ 1770573266786713600