Executive overreach by minority governments

A provision in the Indian constitution allows the executive to make laws in the event oneof the two houses of parliament is not in session. This provision was intended to allow theexecutive to act in case there’s an immediate legislative necessity and the parliament cannotbe convened. Using a bargai...

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Main Authors: ANEY, Madhav S., DAM, Shubhankar
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1963
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2962/viewcontent/executive_overreach_by_minority_governments.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-29622019-04-22T14:29:20Z Executive overreach by minority governments ANEY, Madhav S. DAM, Shubhankar A provision in the Indian constitution allows the executive to make laws in the event oneof the two houses of parliament is not in session. This provision was intended to allow theexecutive to act in case there’s an immediate legislative necessity and the parliament cannotbe convened. Using a bargaining model with asymmetric information we show how partieswithin the parliament may reach an agreement on legislations when the ruling party does notcommand a majority (minority government). The model makes predictions about lawmakingpatterns by the legislature when the parliament is in session, and ordinances by the executivewhen the parliament is not in session. Our three empirical findings are consistent with thismodel. First we find a lack of correlation between legislations and ordinances for majoritygovernments but a negative correlation for minority governments as parliament is substitutedout by the executive when the government lacks the numbers in parliament. Second, we findthat minority governments are less successful in converting ordinances into parliamentarylegislation. Third, we find that the spacing of ordinances within a break is skewed towards thestart of the break for minority governments as they rush to pass ordinances when parliamentgoes out of session. These results indicate that contrary to constitutional mandate, ordinanceshave been used by governments to bypass parliament when they lack the numbers there. Thisstrengthens executive power at the expense of the legislature and this may have long runinstitutional consequences. 2014-12-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1963 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2962/viewcontent/executive_overreach_by_minority_governments.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Asian Studies Political Economy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Asian Studies
Political Economy
spellingShingle Asian Studies
Political Economy
ANEY, Madhav S.
DAM, Shubhankar
Executive overreach by minority governments
description A provision in the Indian constitution allows the executive to make laws in the event oneof the two houses of parliament is not in session. This provision was intended to allow theexecutive to act in case there’s an immediate legislative necessity and the parliament cannotbe convened. Using a bargaining model with asymmetric information we show how partieswithin the parliament may reach an agreement on legislations when the ruling party does notcommand a majority (minority government). The model makes predictions about lawmakingpatterns by the legislature when the parliament is in session, and ordinances by the executivewhen the parliament is not in session. Our three empirical findings are consistent with thismodel. First we find a lack of correlation between legislations and ordinances for majoritygovernments but a negative correlation for minority governments as parliament is substitutedout by the executive when the government lacks the numbers in parliament. Second, we findthat minority governments are less successful in converting ordinances into parliamentarylegislation. Third, we find that the spacing of ordinances within a break is skewed towards thestart of the break for minority governments as they rush to pass ordinances when parliamentgoes out of session. These results indicate that contrary to constitutional mandate, ordinanceshave been used by governments to bypass parliament when they lack the numbers there. Thisstrengthens executive power at the expense of the legislature and this may have long runinstitutional consequences.
format text
author ANEY, Madhav S.
DAM, Shubhankar
author_facet ANEY, Madhav S.
DAM, Shubhankar
author_sort ANEY, Madhav S.
title Executive overreach by minority governments
title_short Executive overreach by minority governments
title_full Executive overreach by minority governments
title_fullStr Executive overreach by minority governments
title_full_unstemmed Executive overreach by minority governments
title_sort executive overreach by minority governments
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2014
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1963
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2962/viewcontent/executive_overreach_by_minority_governments.pdf
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