Political connections, informational asymmetry, and the efficient resolution of financial distress
We show that securities issued by a distressed firm, often through exchange offers, providethe most efficient resolution of financial restructuring. Information asymmetry between thefirm-bank coalition and small bondholders gives rise to other forms of distress resolutionsuch as refinancing, public...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2218 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3217/viewcontent/1_s2.0_S026499932200147X_main.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We show that securities issued by a distressed firm, often through exchange offers, providethe most efficient resolution of financial restructuring. Information asymmetry between thefirm-bank coalition and small bondholders gives rise to other forms of distress resolutionsuch as refinancing, public workout, and the inefficiency of liquidation. We find that politicallobbying by the firm-bank amplifies these inefficiencies and inhibits the development of privatemarket for distressed securities. Cross-country evidence is consistent with this and indicatesthat improved creditor rights, and information facilitating credit bureaus interact in reducingthe likelihood of inefficient distress resolution. |
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