Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs

A group of agents have uncertain needs on a resource, and the resource has to be divided before uncertainty resolves. We propose a class of division rules we call equal-quantile rules, parameterized by λ ∈ (0, 1]. The parameter λ is a common maximal probability of satisfaction — the probability that...

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Main Authors: LONG, Yan, SETHURAMAN, Jay, XUE, Jingyi
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2274
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3273/viewcontent/equal_quantile_rules_RR_.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-32732021-03-23T07:09:04Z Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs LONG, Yan SETHURAMAN, Jay XUE, Jingyi A group of agents have uncertain needs on a resource, and the resource has to be divided before uncertainty resolves. We propose a class of division rules we call equal-quantile rules, parameterized by λ ∈ (0, 1]. The parameter λ is a common maximal probability of satisfaction — the probability that an agent’s realized need is no more than his assignment — imposed on all agents. Thus, the maximal assignment of each agent is his λ-quantile assignment. If the endowment of the resource exceeds the sum of the agents’ λ-quantile assignments, each agent receives his λ-quantile assignment and the resource is not fully allocated to the agents. Otherwise, the resource is fully allocated and the rule equalizes the probability of satisfaction across agents.We provide justifications for the class of equal-quantile rules from two perspectives. First, each equal-quantile rule maximizes a particular utilitarian social welfare function that involves an outside agent, who provides an alternative use of the resource, and aggregates linear individual utilities. Equivalently, it minimizes a particular utilitarian social cost function that is the sum of the aggregate expected waste and the aggregate expected deficit, weighted, respectively, by a unit waste cost and a unit deficit cost. Second, four familiar axioms, consistency, continuity, strict ranking, and ordinality, when extended to the uncertain context, characterize the class of equal-quantile rules. Thus, requiring the four axioms is equivalent to imposing either of these utilitarian objective functions. 2019-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2274 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3273/viewcontent/equal_quantile_rules_RR_.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Resource allocation Fair division Uncertain needs Equal-quantile rules Utilitarian social welfare function Waste Deficit Ordinality Economic Theory
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Resource allocation
Fair division
Uncertain needs
Equal-quantile rules
Utilitarian social welfare function
Waste
Deficit
Ordinality
Economic Theory
spellingShingle Resource allocation
Fair division
Uncertain needs
Equal-quantile rules
Utilitarian social welfare function
Waste
Deficit
Ordinality
Economic Theory
LONG, Yan
SETHURAMAN, Jay
XUE, Jingyi
Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
description A group of agents have uncertain needs on a resource, and the resource has to be divided before uncertainty resolves. We propose a class of division rules we call equal-quantile rules, parameterized by λ ∈ (0, 1]. The parameter λ is a common maximal probability of satisfaction — the probability that an agent’s realized need is no more than his assignment — imposed on all agents. Thus, the maximal assignment of each agent is his λ-quantile assignment. If the endowment of the resource exceeds the sum of the agents’ λ-quantile assignments, each agent receives his λ-quantile assignment and the resource is not fully allocated to the agents. Otherwise, the resource is fully allocated and the rule equalizes the probability of satisfaction across agents.We provide justifications for the class of equal-quantile rules from two perspectives. First, each equal-quantile rule maximizes a particular utilitarian social welfare function that involves an outside agent, who provides an alternative use of the resource, and aggregates linear individual utilities. Equivalently, it minimizes a particular utilitarian social cost function that is the sum of the aggregate expected waste and the aggregate expected deficit, weighted, respectively, by a unit waste cost and a unit deficit cost. Second, four familiar axioms, consistency, continuity, strict ranking, and ordinality, when extended to the uncertain context, characterize the class of equal-quantile rules. Thus, requiring the four axioms is equivalent to imposing either of these utilitarian objective functions.
format text
author LONG, Yan
SETHURAMAN, Jay
XUE, Jingyi
author_facet LONG, Yan
SETHURAMAN, Jay
XUE, Jingyi
author_sort LONG, Yan
title Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
title_short Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
title_full Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
title_fullStr Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
title_full_unstemmed Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
title_sort equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2019
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2274
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3273/viewcontent/equal_quantile_rules_RR_.pdf
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