The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
This note studies the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings intwo-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects therevealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stablematchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data...
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2303 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3302/viewcontent/revealed_matching.pdf |
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