Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?

Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial we...

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Main Author: GUHA, Brishti
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2339
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3338/viewcontent/Preferences_prisoners_private_information_Socrates_av.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-33382020-01-21T15:11:07Z Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? GUHA, Brishti Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern. 2011-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2339 info:doi/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3338/viewcontent/Preferences_prisoners_private_information_Socrates_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Trial Jury preferences Private information Ancient athens Socrates Rationality Common Knowledge Behavioral Economics
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Trial
Jury preferences
Private information
Ancient athens
Socrates
Rationality
Common Knowledge
Behavioral Economics
spellingShingle Trial
Jury preferences
Private information
Ancient athens
Socrates
Rationality
Common Knowledge
Behavioral Economics
GUHA, Brishti
Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
description Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern.
format text
author GUHA, Brishti
author_facet GUHA, Brishti
author_sort GUHA, Brishti
title Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
title_short Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
title_full Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
title_fullStr Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
title_full_unstemmed Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
title_sort preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2011
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2339
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3338/viewcontent/Preferences_prisoners_private_information_Socrates_av.pdf
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