Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?
Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial we...
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2011
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-33382020-01-21T15:11:07Z Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? GUHA, Brishti Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern. 2011-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2339 info:doi/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3338/viewcontent/Preferences_prisoners_private_information_Socrates_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Trial Jury preferences Private information Ancient athens Socrates Rationality Common Knowledge Behavioral Economics |
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Trial Jury preferences Private information Ancient athens Socrates Rationality Common Knowledge Behavioral Economics GUHA, Brishti Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
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Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern. |
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GUHA, Brishti |
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GUHA, Brishti |
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GUHA, Brishti |
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Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
title_short |
Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
title_full |
Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
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Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
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Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
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preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2011 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2339 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3338/viewcontent/Preferences_prisoners_private_information_Socrates_av.pdf |
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