Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite me...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chen, Y-C, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, Sun, Y, Xiong, S.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2021
Subjects:
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Continuous implementation
Implementation
Information perturbations Maskin monotonicity
Rationalizability
Social choice function
Econometrics
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2531
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3530/viewcontent/Rationalizable_Implementation_Jun_12_2021.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
Description
Summary:We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfers are made in any rationalizable profile; the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).

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