Interim regret minimization
We consider a robust version of monopoly pricing when the seller only knows the bound on valuations and the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s value. The seller seeks to minimize interim regret, the forgone expected revenue due to not knowing the distribution of the buyer’s value. The optimal p...
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2024
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-37322024-03-27T09:34:03Z Interim regret minimization HE, Wei Li, Jiangtao WANG, Kexin We consider a robust version of monopoly pricing when the seller only knows the bound on valuations and the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s value. The seller seeks to minimize interim regret, the forgone expected revenue due to not knowing the distribution of the buyer’s value. The optimal pricing policy randomizes over a range of prices; the support of the pricing policy is bounded away from zero. 2024-03-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2733 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3732/viewcontent/Regret__003_.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Robust mechanism design distributional uncertainty interim regret regret minimization Economic Theory |
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Robust mechanism design distributional uncertainty interim regret regret minimization Economic Theory |
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Robust mechanism design distributional uncertainty interim regret regret minimization Economic Theory HE, Wei Li, Jiangtao WANG, Kexin Interim regret minimization |
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We consider a robust version of monopoly pricing when the seller only knows the bound on valuations and the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s value. The seller seeks to minimize interim regret, the forgone expected revenue due to not knowing the distribution of the buyer’s value. The optimal pricing policy randomizes over a range of prices; the support of the pricing policy is bounded away from zero. |
| format |
text |
| author |
HE, Wei Li, Jiangtao WANG, Kexin |
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HE, Wei Li, Jiangtao WANG, Kexin |
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HE, Wei |
| title |
Interim regret minimization |
| title_short |
Interim regret minimization |
| title_full |
Interim regret minimization |
| title_fullStr |
Interim regret minimization |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Interim regret minimization |
| title_sort |
interim regret minimization |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2024 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2733 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3732/viewcontent/Regret__003_.pdf |
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