Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis

When customers temporarily deposit their personal properties with a business which collects a fee, either directly or by incorporating the charge into the price of its goods or services (such as a locker at the supermarket, a parking garage, or a bank safe deposit box), it has long been disputed whe...

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Main Author: ZHANG, Wei
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Language:Chinese
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2332
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sol_research-42842017-10-30T03:42:08Z Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis ZHANG, Wei When customers temporarily deposit their personal properties with a business which collects a fee, either directly or by incorporating the charge into the price of its goods or services (such as a locker at the supermarket, a parking garage, or a bank safe deposit box), it has long been disputed whether a bailment or a lease contract arises between the two parties. In this paper, I tried to approach this problem from a law and economics perspective. Efficiency-oriented judges should establish rules motivating parties to take optimal precautions to minimize the social costs associated with the loss of the property. When sufficient information is available to both parties, each of them can be reasonably expected to undertake such precautions on their own, whether in a competitive or monopolistic market, although a monopolist’s optimal precaution does not necessarily lead to maximum social welfare. However, when an information gap exists to the disadvantage of the customer, the business may be incentivized to pay less attention. We therefore need the law to obligate the business to maintain its optimal precaution level in this situation. As the value of the subject matter increases, customers will be more willing to invest in collecting information, which, in turn, will motivate the business to take precautions at the optimal level. Thus, the value of the subject matter may well serve as a guide to the necessary degree of legal intervention. For these considerations, it is more desirable to interpret the contract at issue as a bailment. Finally, while the legal and economic analysis focuses on efficiency only, there is no obvious conflict between efficiency and fairness in this situation, insofar as we believe that promoting consumers’ welfare is consistent with our objective to enhance fairness. 2010-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2332 Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law chi Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Law and Economics Legal Studies
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language Chinese
topic Law and Economics
Legal Studies
spellingShingle Law and Economics
Legal Studies
ZHANG, Wei
Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis
description When customers temporarily deposit their personal properties with a business which collects a fee, either directly or by incorporating the charge into the price of its goods or services (such as a locker at the supermarket, a parking garage, or a bank safe deposit box), it has long been disputed whether a bailment or a lease contract arises between the two parties. In this paper, I tried to approach this problem from a law and economics perspective. Efficiency-oriented judges should establish rules motivating parties to take optimal precautions to minimize the social costs associated with the loss of the property. When sufficient information is available to both parties, each of them can be reasonably expected to undertake such precautions on their own, whether in a competitive or monopolistic market, although a monopolist’s optimal precaution does not necessarily lead to maximum social welfare. However, when an information gap exists to the disadvantage of the customer, the business may be incentivized to pay less attention. We therefore need the law to obligate the business to maintain its optimal precaution level in this situation. As the value of the subject matter increases, customers will be more willing to invest in collecting information, which, in turn, will motivate the business to take precautions at the optimal level. Thus, the value of the subject matter may well serve as a guide to the necessary degree of legal intervention. For these considerations, it is more desirable to interpret the contract at issue as a bailment. Finally, while the legal and economic analysis focuses on efficiency only, there is no obvious conflict between efficiency and fairness in this situation, insofar as we believe that promoting consumers’ welfare is consistent with our objective to enhance fairness.
format text
author ZHANG, Wei
author_facet ZHANG, Wei
author_sort ZHANG, Wei
title Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis
title_short Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis
title_full Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis
title_fullStr Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis
title_full_unstemmed Bailment or lease: A legal and economic analysis
title_sort bailment or lease: a legal and economic analysis
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2010
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2332
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