The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea

Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872 continues to govern the law of evidence in almost a dozen common law jurisdictions today. But the fundamental features of the IEA would undoubtedly be considered anomalous when viewed against modern notions of relevance and admissibility, for...

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Main Authors: CHEN, Siyuan, CHUA, Eunice
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2753
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sol_research-47112018-07-06T06:00:09Z The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea CHEN, Siyuan CHUA, Eunice Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872 continues to govern the law of evidence in almost a dozen common law jurisdictions today. But the fundamental features of the IEA would undoubtedly be considered anomalous when viewed against modern notions of relevance and admissibility, foremost of which are the fact that the statute represents an attempt to codify relevance exhaustively in an inclusionary, rather than exclusionary way, and the judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence finds no obvious expression in any of its provisions. The IEA has thus had a strained relationship with the common law, especially since judicial powers assume much greater importance in the latter realm. Recent legislative and jurisprudential developments in Singapore (a jurisdiction which has adopted the IEA) have attempted to minimise the applicability of the statute’s relevancy provisions and confer greater discretionary powers on the courts to exclude evidence. The result is that there are now at least five formulations of the court’s general power to exclude evidence, and this article considers if these formulations cohere inter se, and whether any of them can co-exist harmoniously with the IEA’s admissibility paradigm, given that its raison d’être has always been to simplify the admissibility process through exhaustive codification. 2018-06-30T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2753 info:doi/10.1515/ice-2017-0003 Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Indian Evidence Act Asian Studies Comparative and Foreign Law Evidence
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Indian Evidence Act
Asian Studies
Comparative and Foreign Law
Evidence
spellingShingle Indian Evidence Act
Asian Studies
Comparative and Foreign Law
Evidence
CHEN, Siyuan
CHUA, Eunice
The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea
description Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872 continues to govern the law of evidence in almost a dozen common law jurisdictions today. But the fundamental features of the IEA would undoubtedly be considered anomalous when viewed against modern notions of relevance and admissibility, foremost of which are the fact that the statute represents an attempt to codify relevance exhaustively in an inclusionary, rather than exclusionary way, and the judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence finds no obvious expression in any of its provisions. The IEA has thus had a strained relationship with the common law, especially since judicial powers assume much greater importance in the latter realm. Recent legislative and jurisprudential developments in Singapore (a jurisdiction which has adopted the IEA) have attempted to minimise the applicability of the statute’s relevancy provisions and confer greater discretionary powers on the courts to exclude evidence. The result is that there are now at least five formulations of the court’s general power to exclude evidence, and this article considers if these formulations cohere inter se, and whether any of them can co-exist harmoniously with the IEA’s admissibility paradigm, given that its raison d’être has always been to simplify the admissibility process through exhaustive codification.
format text
author CHEN, Siyuan
CHUA, Eunice
author_facet CHEN, Siyuan
CHUA, Eunice
author_sort CHEN, Siyuan
title The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea
title_short The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea
title_full The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea
title_fullStr The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea
title_full_unstemmed The Indian Evidence Act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in Singapore: Not quite different rivers into the same sea
title_sort indian evidence act and recent formulations of the exclusionary discretion in singapore: not quite different rivers into the same sea
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2018
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2753
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