Demand side of corruption and foreign investment law
The United Nations Conventionagainst Corruption, regional anti-corruption conventions, the US ForeignCorrupt Practices Act, and laws against foreign bribery passed pursuant to theOECD Convention on Bribery have not operated to substantially reduce foreigncorrupt practices. The “design flaw” in these...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2017
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2789 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sol_research/article/4747/viewcontent/Demand_side_of_corruption_and_foreign_investment_law.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | The United Nations Conventionagainst Corruption, regional anti-corruption conventions, the US ForeignCorrupt Practices Act, and laws against foreign bribery passed pursuant to theOECD Convention on Bribery have not operated to substantially reduce foreigncorrupt practices. The “design flaw” in these instruments and laws is that theyabandon the model of domestic anti-bribery laws that target both the supply anddemand side of corruption, and instead focus only on the supply side ofcorruption. Shielded from international accountability, corrupt officials inthe demand side continue to extort bribes from investors and other businessmenwho wish to operate in their countries. Arbitration decisions that considercorruption in the context of investment disputes also leave unsanctionedcorrupt conduct on the part of host country officials. While foreign policy objectives of capitalexporting states would discourage and prevent a full scale attack on supplyside corruption, less controversial measures to discourage and even punishdemand side corruption should be established and enforced if foreign commercialbribery is to be meaningfully addressed. |
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