Constitutional judges as agents for development

This Article explores how constitutional judges can become agents for development and how they may wish to go about performing this role. Due to the high politico-economic stakes involved and the inevitability of trade-offs between competing interests, judicial review of developmental questions is l...

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Main Author: DE VISSER, Maartje
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/3025
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sol_research/article/4983/viewcontent/Constitutional_Judges___PV.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sol_research-49832020-02-14T05:53:34Z Constitutional judges as agents for development DE VISSER, Maartje This Article explores how constitutional judges can become agents for development and how they may wish to go about performing this role. Due to the high politico-economic stakes involved and the inevitability of trade-offs between competing interests, judicial review of developmental questions is liable to expose judges to negative fall-outs. At the same time, it is fairly common for Asian constitutions to expressly set out the parameters or objectives for economic development that the State is expected to realize, while simultaneously recognizing a suite of (socio-)economic rights, thereby providing textual ammunition to query the validity of a government’s chosen implementation in court. Against this reality, the Article suggest a range of coping mechanisms that can mitigate risks to judicial legitimacy. In terms of institutional design, the decentralized model of review facilitates access to constitutional justice for affected individuals and communities in remote and rural areas, making this the preferred option in large developing countries. When deciding on the merits of developmental claims, courts should combine a strong presumption of constitutionality as far as the substance of the law is concerned with robust scrutiny of compliance with procedural guarantees. Additionally, courts should be better equipped with knowledge about the methodologies used by and insights from other social sciences to enable them to better evaluate extra-legal evidence submitted and anticipate the likely economic consequences of particular judicial findings, possibly with a view to tailoring their remedies accordingly. 2019-10-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/3025 info:doi/10.1515/ldr-2019-0042 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sol_research/article/4983/viewcontent/Constitutional_Judges___PV.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University constitutional review polycentricity economic question doctrine institutional design access to extra-legal information Constitutional Law
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic constitutional review
polycentricity
economic question doctrine
institutional design
access to extra-legal information
Constitutional Law
spellingShingle constitutional review
polycentricity
economic question doctrine
institutional design
access to extra-legal information
Constitutional Law
DE VISSER, Maartje
Constitutional judges as agents for development
description This Article explores how constitutional judges can become agents for development and how they may wish to go about performing this role. Due to the high politico-economic stakes involved and the inevitability of trade-offs between competing interests, judicial review of developmental questions is liable to expose judges to negative fall-outs. At the same time, it is fairly common for Asian constitutions to expressly set out the parameters or objectives for economic development that the State is expected to realize, while simultaneously recognizing a suite of (socio-)economic rights, thereby providing textual ammunition to query the validity of a government’s chosen implementation in court. Against this reality, the Article suggest a range of coping mechanisms that can mitigate risks to judicial legitimacy. In terms of institutional design, the decentralized model of review facilitates access to constitutional justice for affected individuals and communities in remote and rural areas, making this the preferred option in large developing countries. When deciding on the merits of developmental claims, courts should combine a strong presumption of constitutionality as far as the substance of the law is concerned with robust scrutiny of compliance with procedural guarantees. Additionally, courts should be better equipped with knowledge about the methodologies used by and insights from other social sciences to enable them to better evaluate extra-legal evidence submitted and anticipate the likely economic consequences of particular judicial findings, possibly with a view to tailoring their remedies accordingly.
format text
author DE VISSER, Maartje
author_facet DE VISSER, Maartje
author_sort DE VISSER, Maartje
title Constitutional judges as agents for development
title_short Constitutional judges as agents for development
title_full Constitutional judges as agents for development
title_fullStr Constitutional judges as agents for development
title_full_unstemmed Constitutional judges as agents for development
title_sort constitutional judges as agents for development
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2019
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/3025
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sol_research/article/4983/viewcontent/Constitutional_Judges___PV.pdf
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