Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion

• Main Author: WILLIAMS, John N.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 1996
• Subjects: Philosophy
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/12; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/1011/viewcontent/MooreanAbsurditiesNatureAssertion_1996.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience.